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TAXPAYERS DISCOVERY IN CIVIL FEDERAL
TAX CONTROVERSIES
I. INTRODUCTION
A. SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE
The purpose of this article is to study the right of the taxpayer
to elicit information from the federal government in a dispute over
the amount of tax that is due. The article is limited to: (1) tax-
payer's discovery, hence, it does not cover the ability of the govern-
ment to elicit information about the taxpayer (by administrative
summons or otherwise); (2) civil controversies, hence, it does not
cover the right of the taxpayer to get information from the govern-
ment when a criminal tax dispute arises; (3) federal controversies,
hence, it does not cover the rights a taxpayer may have in gaining
information from state taxing authorities; (4) tax controversies,
hence, it does not cover the ability of the taxpayer to get informa-
tion from the government regarding other types of disputes. Non-
tax cases are discussed to the extent that the author feels they
would be applicable to federal tax controversies. It is probably
disputable whether tax controversies with the government differ
materially from other types of controversies with the government,
however, it is the opinion of the author that they do since taxes
are the source of financial life for the government. Therefore, the
author believes that discovery is looked on with less favor in tax
disputes.
In a self assessment taxing system, it would seem that the
opposite should be the case. The government derives its case from
the information kept by taxpayers. It would seem only fair that
the government should share that information with those from
whom it is derived. The Internal Revenue Service has a duty only
to collect those taxes legally owing to the government. If it has
information which may establish that certain disputed funds are
not owing to the government, it should have a duty to give that
information to the taxpayer-much like a prosecutor has a duty to
turn over favorable information to the attorney for the defense.
B. IMPORTANCE OF DISCOVERY IN TAx DisPuTs
In most situations the taxpayer will be in the best position to
know the facts with regards to taxable transactions. If this is so,
why would he worry about finding out what information the gov-
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ermnent possesses? There are two reasons why the taxpayer should
consider discovery early in the stages of a federal tax dispute. First,
it is important for settlement purposes to know what information
the government possesses. Only by knowing what the other party
believes the facts to be can one intelligently construct what theories
that party is using to support its claim. One can then weigh the
opposition's case and thereby know what amount to offer in settle-
ment. Second, one must decide whether or not he wishes to use
discovery because the different litigating forums provide vastly
different rules regarding discovery.
In forum -shopping a litigant must consider the availability of
discovery from two aspects. First, by properly choosing his forum,
a taxpayer may impede the government from gaining information
from him (of course, the government would still have available the
use of the Commissioner's administrative powers to gain such
needed information). Also, by properly choosing his forum, the
taxpayer may gain access to some government information concern-
ing his case. Of course, discovery is only one of the taxpayer's
considerations in choosing a forum, but in appropriate circum-
stances it might be an important consideration. Discovery may be
available to the taxpayer prior to choosing his litigating forum;
therefore, he might choose to conduct his discovery at the adminis-
trative level, then choose a restrictive forum for litigation.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCOVERY
A. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Freedom of Information Act, reprinted in Appendix I,
amended the Administrative Procedures Act (Section 3) and is now
codified as Section 552 of Title 5 of the United States Code.
Section 552 (a) (1) of the Act provides that certain information
should be made available to the public by publication in the Federal
Registar. It also provides that such may be deemed to be so pub-
lished if incorporated by reference into the Federal Registar. Sec-
tion 552 (a) (2) provides that certain information should be made
available to the public by the establishment of "reading rooms"
where the public may come to the agency to elicit the desired
information. Section 552 (a) (3) provides that all other agency in-
formation shall be made available to the public upon request for
"identifiable records." It also gives jurisdiction to the federal district
courts to hear controversies arising out of such cases and places the
burden of proof of sustaining its action upon the agency. Section
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552 (b) lists nine exempt classifications to which Section 552 does
not apply. Those classifications include information required by
executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy, information related solely to the internal person-
nel rules and practices of an agency, information exempted from
disclosure by statute, trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,
certain inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums, files the dis-
closure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
privacy, investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes
(to a limited extent), certain information about financial institu-
tions, and certain geological and geophysical information. They will
be discussed in more detail later.
B. HISTORY OF THE ACT
The history of the Freedom of Information Act is at best con-
fusing, especially if one is attempting to decipher the combined
meaning of the Senate and the House. The reason for this is that
although both passed the same bill, each meant something different
in enacting the legislation.' One author explains the difference by
stating:
After the bill had passed the Senate on the basis of a committee
report that was reasonably faithful to the words of the bill, the
House committee was subjected to pressures to restrict the dis-
closure requirements. It yielded to the pressures. But it did not
change the bill. Instead, it wrote the restrictions into the committee
report. These restrictions differ drastically from the bill as passed
by the Senate; they often contradict the words of the bill, and they
sometimes contradict both the statutory words and the Senate com-
mittee report.
1 "Even though the records of the various hearings over a ten year
period are voluminous, probably more than ninety-five per cent of
the useful legislative history is found in a ten page Senate committee
report and in a fourteen page House committee report [S. Rep. No. 813,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) and H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966).] Problems of interpretation are aggravated not only by
the 'specifically stated' clause but also by the differences between what
the Act says on its face and what the committee reports say, and they
are further complicated by differences between the two committee
reports. In general, the Senate committee is relatively faithful to the
words of the Act, and the House committee ambitiously undertakes to
change the meaning that appears in the Act's words. The main thrust
of the House committee remarks that seem to pull away from the
literal statutory words is almost always in the direction of nondis-
closure. The Attorney General's Memorandum consistently relies on
such remarks by the House Committee." Davis, The Information Act:
A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 761, 762-63 (1967).
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I believe (a) that statements in a House committee report that
contradict the bill and depart from the understanding of the Senate
committee are not the law, and (b) that inserting such statements
into a committee report, instead of changing the bill, is a clear
abuse .... 2
The reasons why the courts will reject the House committee's
abuse of legislative history, even though the Attorney General sup-
ports it, are overwhelming. Allowing the meaning of clear statutory
words to be drastically changed by the House committee report
would have many unsound consequences. Three major ones are:
(1) The House that acts first would be deprived of any voice in the
final meaning of the enactment, for the House that acts second could
always adopt the same bill but alter its meaning through committee
reports. (2) The sound system of the conference committee would
be defeated, for the House that acts second, even when it knows the
other House disagrees, could always make law as it chooses through
the committee reports. (3) Statutes which are clear on their face
would become unreliable indicia of the effective law. Indeed, if the
Aitorney General's Memorandum were to prevail, no careful lawyer
could ever give advice by looking at a statute; he would always
have to examine the legislative history.3
The one apparently truthful statement concerning the Freedom of
Information Act is that, "there is no doubt that the legislative
history of the act will play an important role in any subsequent
agency or court interpretation," 4 but at least one authority has ex-
pressed that such should not be the case because an unambiguous
Act should not be made ambiguous by its legislative history.5
Unfortunately, it is not as yet clear whether the courts will
generally follow the Senate Committee Report or that of the House.
Probably the fairest statement of the law today is:
2 The omitted portion reads as follows: "I realize that habits have
grown up in some quarters, both legislative and judicial, that are
sometimes at variance with these two beliefs, but such habits seem to
me very much in need of re-examination. The basic principle is quite
elementary: The content of the law must depend upon the intent of
both Houses, not of just one. In this instance, only the bill, not the
House committee's statements at variance with the bill, reflects the
intent of both Houses. Indeed, no one will ever know whether the
Senate committee or the Senate would have concurred in the restric-
tions written into the House committee report.
All along the line, I think the Attorney General's Memorandum is
unsound in assuming that whatever the House committee says is the
law even when the words of the statute are unequivocally the opposite.
The agencies, of course, will follow the Memorandum because it strains
in the direction they want to go. But the courts will provide a better
balance." Id. at 809-10. (footnotes omitted).
s Id. at 810.
4 Kass, The New Freedom of Information Act, 53 A.B.A.J. 667 (1967).
5 B. EATON & 1V. LycC, Tax Practice As Affected by the Freedom of
Information Act and the Information Retrieval System, DEFmING
TAx FRAUD PRosEcuTroNs, 216-17 (1969).
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The Attorney General, in his commentary on the Act, relies on
the remarks of the House Committee, and the Revenue Service
Regulations go along with the Attorney General
On the other hand, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on
the Act is, in general, quite faithful to the statutory words and
suggests a more literal and restricted meaning for the exemptions.
The cases so far decided are not entirely consistent with each other;
most move in the direction of the Senate Report, but some follow
the House Report and the Attorney General's memorandum. 6
C. USE IN LITIGATION AND GENERAL SCOPE OF THE ACT
The extent to which the Act may be used by litigants as a
substitute for discovery is not clear. One authority views it as
follows:
Before July 4, 1967, the effective date of the Act, a taxpayer
could obtain these items only by using the discovery techniques
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after his case was at
issue in court. One of the principal changes made by the Act is
that it allows much of this discovery to take place at the administra-
tive level, before the case gets to court.7
Another suggests that it might be more limited:
Before making any contrast, however, I feel constrained to point
out that the new Act does not repeal or specifically abrogate the
Federal Rules. Rather, it creates additional rights and a separate
procedure for obtaining information from the government outside
of litigation. While the Department of Justice's position has not
been resolved it could be argued, for example, that the new Act is
not available to a party who has commenced a district court suit
against the government and we would plead, in a petition to com-
pel disclosure, that "another action is pending."s
To the knowledge of the author, no such argument has been made
by the Department of Justice, or at least, no cases have discussed
the issue. In fact, the Act itself was amended so that the agency
was to "make the records promptly available to any person."9
The scope of the Act is literally quite broad. In general terms
the breadth of the Act has been aptly summarized as follows:
Despite the clumsy structuring of subparagraphs (a)(1), (2) and
(3), which might have afforded an excuse for a more restrictive in-
terpretation, the Attorney General's memorandum clearly states
that the Act makes all agency information available in one way or
6 Emanuel, Using the Freedom of Information Act in Tax Cases, P-H
TAX IDEAS 1 28,017.5 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
7 Id. at 28,017.
8 Panel Discussion on Freedom of Information Act, 20 (3) A.B.A. SECTION
OF TAXATiON BULLETIN 43, 52 (1967) (remarks of Mr. Rogovin). This
publication is now called TAX LAWYER.
9 5 U.S.C. 552 (a) (3) (1967).
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another unless the agency meets the burden of showing that the
information falls "within specific categories of matters which are
exempt from public disclosure." Subparagraph (a)(1) describes
those matters which must be published in the Federal Register;
subparagraph (2) covers those which must be indexed and made
available for inspection and copying; while under subparagraph (3)
all oihers, unless specifically exempt, must be made available on
request if they are reasonably identifiable.
The Act thus compels disclosure of a much greater range of
records than those obtainable under old Section 3 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; and since it seems to eliminate the de-
fenses of relevancy, good cause, work product and executive privi-
lege, except in two partially exempt categories, litigants will often
prefer to utilize the Act instead of relying entirely on Federal
Rules.1O
As mentioned previously, the test for disclosure differs under
the Freedom of Information Act as compared to the test courts
have devised under the discovery rules. Under the Act, it is:
The nature of the records themselves, rather than the interest of
the person seeking the records, is now the controlling test. The
Senate report concluded that "for the great majority of different
records, the public as a whole has a right to know what its Govern-
ment is doing.""1
In fact, the nature of the records is important not only in determin-
ing whether disclosure is necessary, but also in determining the
means of disclosure. If such records fall within the class of records
enumerated under Section 552 (a) (1), then they must be published
in the Federal Registar. If a person does not have actual notice of
the record, and it is not so published, then he "may not in any
manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by" such
records. It is up to the agency to determine whether or not a
record falls within the category of records that Section 552 (a) (1)
embrace and: "If the agency guesses wrong and puts information
in the latter rather than the former category, a private party can
contend that he cannot be adversely affected thereby."'2
Perhaps Section 552 (a) (2) is the most important segment of
the Freedom of Information Act (assuming one can steer clear of
the exemptions from the Act in Section 552 (b) ):
The most significant gains from the entire Act are those growing
out of the requirement in subsection (b) of disclosure of six items-
orders, opinions, statements of policy, interpretations, staff manuals,
and instructions. An incidental gain is the opening of agency mem-
10 Kass, supra note 4, at 176-177.
11 Id. at 669 n.4.
12 Sexton, New law changes rules on what information IRS must dis-
close; confusion likely, 26 (2) TAxATION 120, 122 (1967).
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bers' votes in proceedings, required by subsection (d). Although the
exemptions of subsection (e) drastically affect the disclosure of
information, their effect on disclosure of legal materials is relatively
small.13
It has been suggested by several authorities that Section 552 (a)
(2) requires the publication of all revenue rulings and staff manuals
(which set the guidelines in determining what returns are to be
audited) .14 However, the government does not interpret Section
552 (a) (2) so broadly. It believes that it need only index that ma-
terial which is of precedential value.1 5 One government official
believes that Section 552 (a) (2) does not require the indexing and
disclosure of either private revenue rulings or of deficiency notices.' 6
The only case discussing the matter was litigated in the Court of
Claims (the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction to decide
cases under the Freedom of Information Act), and the court stated
that the rulings would not be discoverable under Section 552.'
Section 552 (a) (3) is the blanket coverage provision of the Act.
It says that "each agency, on request for identifiable records ...
shall make the records available to any -person." It then goes on
to state that the action to get such records should be brought in
federal district court after one has exhausted his administrative
remedies, that the matter should be tried de novo, and that the
burden is on the agency to sustain its action. The taxpayer should
phrase his request as broadly as possible to get the documents that
he will need.'8 However, at least one court has rejected a request
as being overbroad in part.19
D. EXEMPTIONS FROM DISCLOSURE
With the sweep of Section 552 (a) (1), (2) and (3) it is not
surprising that most of the litigation in the area concerns one of
the exemptions from disclosure enumerated in Section 552 (b). It
is especially appropriate that this be so since the government bears
The statute lists nine exempt classifications. Exemptions b (1),
b (6), b (8) and b (9) have little significance in regard to a taxpayer's
13 Davis, supra note 1, at 804.
14 Id. at 770, 778. See also, Kass, supra note 4, at 184.
15 Treas. Reg. § 601.702(b) (1) (1967).
16 Panel Discussion on Freedom of Information Act, supra note 8, at
55, 57 (Remarks of Mr. Uretz.); See also, Uretz, Freedom of Informa-
tion and the IRS, 20 ARK. L. REv. 283 (1967).
17 Shakespeare Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 772 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
18 P-H TAX IDEAs f28,017.2 (1970).
19 Abel v. I.R.S., 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-5347 (1970), which also
stands for the proposition of exhausting one's administrative remedies.
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the burden of proof of its right to non-disclosure by fitting the
requested documents within one of the exemptions.
right to elicit information from his government in tax disputes and,
therefore, they will not be discussed.
1. Section b(2)-related solely to the internal personnel rules and
practices of an agency
As before, the House Committee Reports and the Attorney Gen-
eral's Memorandum attempt to expand an otherwise clear provision
(one which the Senate Committee adhered to the obvious meaning)
by using the Committee Report in an awkward attempt to delete
the word solely in the exemption. 20 Most of the cases to date accept
the Senate version and reject the version the government would
have enacted. 21
2. Section b(3)-specifically exempted from disclosure by statute
There seems to be little controversy in this area. The Regulations
list the statutes that will most likely prevent disclosure in the
federal tax area.22 Of the Internal Revenue Code, Sections 4102,
4773, 4775, 6103, 6104, 6105, 6106, 6108, 7213, and 7237 (e) will under
the appropriate circumstances limit disclosure. Also, the govern-
ment alleges it cannot disclose certain information under 18 U.S.C.
1905.2 There are few cases on point, but in a non-tax case 18 U.S.C.
20 (Referring to the House Report) "These interpretations go far beyond
the Act's language, give no effect to the words 'solely' and 'personnel'
in the exempting clause and seem contrary to the thrust of subpara-
graph (a) (2), which requires disclosure of 'administrative staff man-
uals and instructions to staff' that affect any member of the public!"
Kass, supra note 4, at 198.
21 Benson v. General Services Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veteran's Admin-
istration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
22 Treas. Reg. § 601.701(b) (2) (1967).
23 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1948) reads as follows: '"isclosure of confidential
information generally. Whoever, being an officer or employee of the
United States or of any department or agency thereof, publishes,
divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent
not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course
of his employment or official duties or by reason of any exavnination
or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or filed
with, such department or agency or officer or employe therof, which
information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, op-
erations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential
statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or
expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or associa-
tion; or permits any income return or copy thereof or any book con-
taining any abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or examined
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1905 was held not to apply under the particular facts.
24
3. Section b(4)-trade secrets and commercial or financial informa-
tion obtained from a person and privileged or confidential
It has been said that this exemption will probably not be im-
portant in tax practice,25 and the way the courts are construing the
exemption seems to affirm that statement. Several courts have held
that this exemption protects only information within the agency
itself.26 Some courts have allowed selection of certain information
when the government attempted to use this exemption from dis-
closure, and an in camera inspection of the alleged "privileged or
confidential" records sought.2 7 Note that the exemption only applies
to (1) trade secrets and commercial or financial information, (2)
obtained from a person (outside of the agency) which is (3) privi-
leged or confidential. However, one court has held that if the
information is exempt in the hands of one agency, then that in-
formation retains its exempt character even if it is transferred to
another agency.28
4. Section b(5)-inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or let-
ters which would not be available by law to a party other than
an agency in litigation with the agency
This exemption is probably the most signicant of all in tax litiga-
tion with the government. The test the government has adopted to
determine whether or not disclosure should be made is whether or
not the information sought would be "routinely" discoverable under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.29 Needless to say, the courts
have not concurred with the government position. However, there
are several tests that courts have applied; one court has applied
the following test:
by any person except as provided by law; shall be fined not more
than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall
be removed from office or employment."
24 Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veteran's Administra-
tion, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
25 Kass, supra note 4, at 204.
26 Benson v. General Services Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veteran's Ad-
ministration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
27 Grumman Aircraft Engineer Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
28 Grumman Aircraft Engineer Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
29 The government position was taken from H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), and incorporated in Treas. Reg. § 601.701(b) (1)
(v) (1967).
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It is thus irrelevant whether GSA would or would not routinely
grant access to these documents.
Under a strict construction, GSA could prove that the documents
are exempted under section (b)(5) by showing that there is no type
of litigation between the agency and a private party in which the
court would order production of the documents in appropriate
discovery proceedings. This proposition is a universal negative,
which is difficult to establish. And the statute does not place upon
GSA the burden of proving that universal negative, but of sustain-
ing its action. GSA can do this by showing that there are actions
in which the documents would be sought in discovery proceedings,
but in the normal sort of action in which the documents might be
of value, courts would not order the documents produced. At this
point, the burden would shift to the plaintiff at least to come for-
ward with a theory of an action in which a court would order the
documents produced. 30
Another court has held that the exemptions should be narrowly
construed giving effect to the purpose of the statute, 1 while another
court has applied a more stringent test under b (5) by saying:
To determine if the requirements of the fifth exemption are met,
this court must ask if the records sought are inter- or intra-agency
memoranda or letters which would not be available to any party
in any litigation in which the agency having the records might now
be involved. The fulcrum of this test is discovery practices as
regulated by the courts, not discovery as it is practiced by the
government, as suggested by the Attorney General's Memoran-
dum ....
To decide whether the records sought here are within the fifth
exemption, the court must determine whether they were part of the
deliberate process of the agency or were factual in substance. The
legislative history of the Act supports this conclusion. The language
"which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency" was substituted on the recom-
mendation of the Senate Judiciary Committee for "dealing solely
with matters of law or policy." In explaining the old language the
Committee had said in an earlier report that "All factual [sic]
material in Government records is to be made available to the
public. ... ." The substituted language, being more precise, seems
to be a refinement of the policy versus fact distinction so that the
distinction can still be used within the discovery test now explicitly
laid down by the statute. It is at least clear, in light of the strong
Congressional drive to promote disclosure, that the amendment was
not intended to place "factual material" within the coverage of the
fifth exemption.m2
30 Benson v. General Services Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590, 595.
(W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969).
31 Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
32 Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veteran's Administra-
tion, 301 F. Supp. 796, 804-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
300 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 2 (1971)
The factual v. theory distinction has been approved by several
courts33 including the only tax case in which the issue has been
properly presented.34 However, one must keep in mind that these
cases were all decided prior to the 1970 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and an argument can be made that these
amendments liberalized discovery under the Rules; hence, there
should be more discovery allowed under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act. Specifically, Rules 33 and 36 have been revised to permit
discovery of opinions not only relating to fact, but also of applica-
tion of law to fact (see subsequent discussion herein); hence, dis-
covery under Section 552 should also be broadened to encompass
more than mere factual data. One case under the federal rules has
permitted discovery of regular and special agents' instruction
manuals,35 so perhaps the government cannot raise a viable defense
under b (5) to them even if they are not deemed within Section
552 (a) (2); thus, they would be discoverable under Section 552
(a) (3).
If the intra-agency and/or inter-agency memo has been incorpo-
rated into a public document by reference, it loses its exempt
status.36 The fact that a person could have attained the information
from sources other than the government is immaterial, s and it does
not defeat his right to gain such information under the Act.
5. Section b (7)-investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other
than an agency
The government position on b (7) differs from that on b (5).38
33 General Services Administration v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1969); Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
But see, International Paper Co. v. F.P.C., 438 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1971).
34 Talbott Constr. Co. v. United States, 49 F.R.D. 68 (E.D. Ky. 1969).
However, the court's opinion seems to say that the taxpayer has the
burden of proving that the information sought is not exempt rather
than that the government has to prove that the information is exempt.
This seems contrary to the express wording of the statute.
35 United States v. Moriarty, 23 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 69-930 (E.D. Wis.
1969). For more discovery allowed by the same litigants see United
States v. Moriarty, 278 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
36 American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
37 "And the fact that appellant might, presumably by a combination of
intuition and diligent research, ferret out some of the materials relied
upon is surely no reason to suppose that Congress made revelation
under the Freedom of Information Act contingent upon a showing of
exhaustion of one's own ingenuity." Ackerley v. Ley, 420 F.2d
1336, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
38 U.S. ATT'Y GEN., MEMORANIDU ON THE PUBLIC INF oRMATION SECTION
OF THE ADmINIsTRATIvE PROCEDURES ACT 37, 38.
CIVIL FEDERAL TAX CONTROVERSIES
It believes that b-(5) opens certain information to the general public,
while b (7) opens information only to litigants (and then such in-
formation is only available to the extent that is allowed by prior
law). There is presently a split of authority as to the extent of
discovery available to litigants under b (7). One court has taken a
rather restrictive view (citing the House Reports and the Attorney
General's Memorandum) ,39 while another court has taken a broader
view.40 The latter decision suggested that the test should be whether
or not such information would be available to the party litigants if
the government was not a party to the action. However, neither
decision involved tax cases or related issues.
E. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE ACT
Even if the records sought should be available under the Act,
it has been held that the court may deny discovery if in balancing
the equities, it feels that disclosure should not be made.41
To what extent the agencies or the courts will allow disclosure
is yet to be seen. One authority has said: "The liberal purpose of
the Act will hopefully cause the Service and the courts to choose
the course of maximum disclosure."42 And a government representa-
tive has assured us by saying: "You may be assured that the Reve-
nue Service is prepared to expend the required time and effort to
effectuate, in full, the intent and spirit of this Act ' 43
The Regulations do not look so optimistic,44 but they do provide
that unless precluded by law, the Service may provide the public
with information even though it does not feel that such is required
under the Act 5 Certain practitioners assert a substantial amount
of success from such requests even considering the hard line legal
stand the Service has taken on the disclosure standards4 6
It would seem that if the Freedom of Information Act were to
give taxpayers any more meaningful disclosure than they could
attain prior to its passage, then it must be given a broader scope
than that which the regulations now provide.
39 Benson v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Neb. 1970).
40 Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
41 Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veteran's Administra-
tion, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
42 Kass, supra note 4, at 205.
43 21 TAx LAVrER 19 (1967) (remarks of the Honorable Lester R. Uretz,
Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service).
44 Treas. Reg. §§ 601.701 and 601.702 (1967).
45 Id.
46 B. EATON & M. LYNCH, supra note 5, at 246.
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III. COURT DISCOVERY
A. TAX COURT
The U.S. Tax Court has no rules of discovery. Its rules with
regard to depositions apply to evidentary depositions, and it has
been stated that:
There is no formal Tax Court procedure that a taxpayer can
utilize to discover what testimony a witness will give at the hearing
or what evidence is in the Service's possession. While the taxpayer
may take depositions of a witness, these may be taken for eviden-
tiary purposes and only when the witness will not be available to
testify at the trial or when the deposition is to be submitted in
lieu of testimony at the trial
It should be noted that the absence of taxpayer's discovery in
the Tax Court stems from the Court's policy of refusing applications
for the taking of depositions for discovery purposes. Hence, within
the framework of the present Tax Court Rules discovery could
be permitted. It is possible, therefore, that the Tax Court could
change its practice and permit taxpayers discovery in appropriate
cases without changing the Tax Court Rules. 47
The likehihood of the court changing its policy is minute. Chief
Judge Drennen commented (unofficially) about the lack of dis-
covery in his court as follows:
In its discussion of the present structure of the trial court system
the Justice Department report compares the availability and use (or
lack thereof) of discovery in the three forums, pointing out that
extensive discovery is available only in the district courts, that the
Tax Court has no discovery rule at all, and that the availability and
use of discovery in the Court of Claims lies about midway between
the district courts and the Tax Court. It is true that the Tax Court
has no specific discovery rule and that it has no procedures for use
of discovery for discovery purposes alone, as contrasted with dis-
covery for purposes of obtaining evidence. The Tax Court believes
that its stipulation rules, which have worked very successfully in
the past, if followed to the hilt, provide about all the discovery that
is necessary or desirable in tax cases. Of course, if this impression
is wrong and it is convincingly shown that a discovery rule should
be adopted by the Tax Court, I do not believe the Tax Court would
refuse to adopt such a rule. Because of its nation-wide jurisdiction
the Tax Court would have some difficulty in controlling discovery,
but extrajudicial discovery could be conducted as easily by litigants
in the Tax Court as by litigants in the district courts. If closer
supervision and control of discovery proceedings is found necessary,
I suppose in a fully integrated and correlated tax-litigating struc-
ture, the district court judges could supervise discovery proceedings
in their locality, whether the information sought to be obtained is to
be used in litigation in the Tax Court or in their own courts.
47 M. GARBIS & R. FROME, PRocEDuREs iN FEDERAL TAX CONTROVERsS,
6-14 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
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But I am not convinced that extensive discovery is either neces-
sary or desirable in connection with federal tax litigation. I am a
firm believer in the modern-day philosophy of trial procedures that
all facts and evidence that either party intends to use during the
course of a trial should be made known and available to the oppos-
ing party before the trial begins, and that "surprise" during the
course of a trial should be eliminated. I think that is generally the
case in all Tax Court proceedings under our existing rules. But I
am not convinced that uncontrolled, extrajudicial, random discovery
for the sake of discovery alone has a proper place in the tax field
or is really wanted by either taxpayers or the Government. Under
our self-assessing tax system all facts relating to the taxpayer's tax
lability are known or should be known to him. I do not know what
real benefit a taxpayer would derive from discovery proceedings
against the Government that is not otherwise available to him.
Almost anything the Government intends to use as evidence in the
trial of a case can usually be discovered by the taxpayer under the
court's pleading, stipulation, pretrial, and motions procedures which
are presently available, and I have seen very few instances of sur-
prise on the part of either party during the course of trials over
which I have presided as a judge on the Tax Court. If the only
objective of the taxpayer in discovery proceedings is to find out
whether the Government has all the information relative to the
taxpayer's liability that he, the taxpayer, has, I do not believe this
is an objective that deserves assistance. On the other side of the
coin, the Government's use of discovery would seem to me to be a
means of circumventing the law that protects a taxpayer against a
second inspection of his books and records. I think this rule of
law is a meritorious one and is jealously guarded by the courts. The
Government has many tools at its command for obtaining all the
information the taxpayer has relative to his tax liability during the
course of the audit and investigation of the taxpayer's returns. I
would think it might subject a taxpayer to an unwarranted and
repeated invasion of his privacy if the Government is allowed to
conduct fishing expeditions in the name of discovery after the case
gets to court. But, as I said at the outset, The Tax Court could and
probably would adopt a discovery rule if it is convinced that such
would improve the administration of justice and that the parties
really want it. However, at the last Tax Court Judicial Conference,
attended by representatives of the court, the Chief Counsels Office,
and the Tax Section of the American Bar Association, the matter
was discussed and neither of the litigants' representatives felt that
adoption of a discovery rule by the Tax Court was either necessary
or desirable at this time.48
Not all tax practitioners share the views of the Chief Judge.49
However, it would seem that the Chief Judge's views have some
statistical backing. A recent study revealed that when discovery
48 Drennen, Federal Tax Litigation as Viewed From the Back of the
Bench, 22 S. CAL. TAX INsT. 1, 12-14 (1970), also called MAJOR
TAX PLANNING.
49 Ritholz, Diverse Views on Discovery in the Tax Court, 21 A.B.A. SEC-
7ON or TAxATioN BULLETIN 639 (1968).
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was available the government rather than the taxpayer utilized it
more frequently.50 The same study on the other hand recognized
that:
While discovery is ordinarily employed by the Government, there
are situations in which the taxpayer is anxious to learn facts in the
Government's possession, and in those instances, the availability of
discovery in the district courts, and, to a lesser extent, in the Court
of Claims, may influence the taxpayer's choice. Of course, the tax-
payer may desire to expose as few of the facts of the financial
transactions involved in his case as possible and may, therefore,
seek to avoid the possibility of extensive discovery by bringing suit
in the Tax Court.51
In Starr v. Comrissioner52 the Seventh Circuit held that the lack
of discovery procedures in the Tax Court did not deny the taxpayer
due process:
Discovery procedure has improved the administration of justice and
speeded the disposition of civil cases in both state and federal
courts. However, it has never been held that the Constitution of the
United States requires that discovery procedure be adopted by any
court. We are unwilling to make any such decision. In our view,
no constitutional question is involved. Furthermore, we think the
request that the Tax Court modify its rules was addressed to a
matter that was purely discretionary with that court. Board of Tax
Appeals v. United States, 59 App. D.C. 161, 37 F.2d 442. We hold
that taxpayer was not denied due process because the Tax Court
refused to grant his motion for discovery.5 3
However, in Robida v. Commissioner5 4 the Ninth Circuit allowed
the petitioner discovery of his personal records. The factual situation
in Robida was exceptional, and it should not be relied upon as set-
ting any trend to allow discovery in the Tax Court.55
Since as early as 194756 there has been a movement to allow
more discovery in the Tax Court; however, to date such movement
has met with little success. The absence of formal discovery rules
in the Tax Court does not mean that a taxpayer cannot elicit in-
formation to a limited extent from the government. Certain motion
practice in the court will provide the taxpayer with some informa-
50 Dept. of Justice, Study of the Trial Court System for Federal Civil
Tax Disputes, 22 TAx LAWYER 95, 105 (1968).
51 Id. at 108.
52 226 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 993 (1956).
53 Id. at 722.
54 371 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1967).
55 The factual situation was unique in that the records the taxpayer
sought were his own personal records which had been seized by
German authorities and turned over to the Internal Revenue Service.
56 2 L. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 7.31 n. 94 (1955).
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tion. Rule 31 (b) requires the parties to stipulate to all facts not in
dispute, which is somewhat similar to requests for admissions. One
author has said:
It is in obtaining a stipulation that the exercise of skill by
counsel is required. Generally, stipulations can be obtained either
informally by consent or by a motion made to the Court. The
second method, although described as a "motion for an order to
show cause why certain facts should not be stipulated" is actually
quite similar to a request for admissions used in many states and
in the Federal courts.57
Rule 17 of the U.S. Tax Court provides for a motion for a further
and better statement of the nature of a party's claim or defense
upon the showing of good cause. Rule 28 provides for pretrial con-
ferences. At one time the Tax Court allowed pre-trial depositions
to preserve testimony. These, however, were poor discovery tools
compared with those available in other forums.
[I]t [referring to the discovery in Tax Court motion practice] is
hardly equivalent to pretrial and discovery as it is handled by some
district courts under the Federal Rules. Regardless, the Tax Court
has been very successful in boiling down issues and simplifying
tria]s.58
1. Pre-trial Depositions to Preserve Testimony
Prior to 196119 the Tax Court allowed the taking of depositions
to preserve testimony.60 However, in Louisville Builders Supply Co.
v. Commissioner,61 the Sixth Circuit held that the Tax Court's order
allowing such was beyond the power of that court. It did so on the
reasoning that when such authority exists, it is specifically provided
for by a rule of court or a statute. The Court felt that Rule 45 of
the Tax Court 62 did not encompass depositions prior to institution
of proceedings in that court. It also felt that the rules of evidence
of the District of Columbia Code allowing for such depositions (§
14-201) 63 were not applicable because they applied only to proceed-
57 M. GARBIs & R. FROmE, supra note 47, at 6-23.
58 L. KErn & D. ARGUE, TAX COURT PRACTCE 530-31 (1970).
50 Louisville Builders Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 333 (6th Cir.
1961).
60 2 L. CASEY. supra note 56. at § 7.22 n. 32.
61 294 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1961).
62 Rule 45 (a) and (b) are substantially the same now as they were
when the court decided the case.
63 The Court quoted Section 14-201 as folldws: "In any case where the
interests of justice may require, the District Court of the United States
for the District of Columbia may grant a dedimus potertatum to take
depositions according to common usage, and may, according to the
usages of chancery, direct depositions to be taken in perpetuam rei
memoriam if they relate to any matters that might be cognizable in
any court of the United States."
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ings of the Tax Court, and Rule 7 of the Tax Court defines initiation
of proceedings as beginning with the filing of the petition. How-
ever, the deposition involved in Louisville Builders was not only
one to preserve testimony but also a discovery mechanism. The
Court of Appeals itself recognized this fact in its opinion by stating:
We construe it to be an application for leave to take a deposition
for discovery. A fair reading of it demonstrates that while he seeks
to perpetuate testimony, he likewise is seeking to employ the pro-
cedural aid of pretrial discovery. His application, other than giving
a description of the subject matter of his inquiry, does not set out
the facts which he desires to establish by the witness von Sieben-
thal, nor the substance of the testimony which he expects to elicit
from him. (Such would be required if Rule 27 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were available and employed by the Commis-
sioner for the purpose of perpetuating testimony.) Absent some
statement of what the witness is expected to say, it cannot be deter-
mined whether his testimony will be material and relevant. What-
ever the form of procedure used, one seeking to perpetuate testi-
mony must, by his application for leave to do so, demonstrate that
the testimony sought "will be material in the determination of the
matter in controversy; that the testimony will be competent evi-
dence;" Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 348, 78 L. Ed. 1298,
1301. Whether legally sufficient for either purpose, the application
involved seeks leave to take a deposition which will both discover
and perpetuate testimony.64
Perhaps this is one reason why the court was so hostile to allowing
the order granting the deposition to stand. In any case, the Tax
Court no longer allows such depositions-for discovery or for pre-
serving testimony.
In Estate of Bernard A. Marx v. Commissioner 5 the Tax Court
decided to follow the Sixth Circuit rule. The case was strictly one
of preserving testimony. The applicants wished to preserve the
testimony of a 58 year old doctor who had heart trouble. The testi-
mony concerned a patient of the doctor who had made $1,575,906.21
of gifts prior to his death. Although the case is not clear on the
point, it would seem the issue was whether such gifts were made
in contemplation of death.
Perhaps it is a mixed blessing that the Tax Court does not allow
discovery. This allows the taxpayer to have a forum available
where he will not have to bear the expense necessary to carry on
discovery and where he can prevent the government from using
the court process as a means of eliciting more information about the
particular tax dispute. It is unfortunate that the taxpayer does not
64 294 F.2d 333, 335 (6th Cir. 1961).
65 40 T.C. 1 (1963).
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have a forum that allows liberal discovery without payment of the
tax (and suit for refund), but perhaps a liberal interpretation of
the Freedom of Information Act may rectify the situation.
B. FEDERaL DIsTRICT COURT
Rule 26 provides for the scope of discovery in the federal district
court system and Rules 27 through 37 explain the methods by which
discovery is to take place. -
The availability of discovery varies widely between the forums.
The most extensive discovery is permitted in the district courts
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There is no discovery
procedure in the Tax Court and only limited discovery in the Court
of Claims.
In the district courts, three discovery devices are used most
frequently in tax litigation: depositions upon oral examination,
interrogatories to adverse parties, and requests for admission. All
three methods are extrajudicial, available for use by the parties
without intercession by the court.66
Since the liberalization of the federal court discovery rules in
1970, it would seem that most practitioners would agree that the
federal district court forum provides the most liberal discovery
rules. The changes brought about by the 1970 revision pertinent to
tax litigation can best be summarized as follows:
A showing of good cause is no longer required for discovery of
documents and things and entry upon land (Rule 34). However, a
showing of need is required for discovery of "trial preparation"
materials other than a party's discovery of his own statement and
a witness' discovery of his own statement; and protection is afforded
against disclosure in such documents of mental impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions, or legal theories concerning the litigation. (Rule
26 (b) (3)).... Provision is made for discovery with respect to ex-
perts retained for trial preparation, and particularly those experts
who will be called to testify at trial (Rule 26 (b) (4)). .. . It is pro-
vided that interrogatories and requests for admission are not objec-
tionable simply because they relate to matters of opinion or con-
tention, subject of course to the supervisory power of the court
(Rules 33 (b), 36 (a)).67
The government usually objects to taxpayer's discovery basing
its objection on one or more of the following grounds: privilege
(either attorney-client or executive), relevancy, good cause, or work
product. It seems that it depends on the nature of the case as to
whether the government prevails in its objections. The cases in
which discovery has been an issue might be classified as follows:
(1) tax refund suits (perhaps this classification would be further
66 Dept. of Justice, supra note 50, at 105.
67 Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating
to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 487-88 (1969)
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subdivided into cases involving fraud and those not involving
fraud); (2) suits by the government to collect a refund allegedly
erroneously made; and (3) suits by the government to enforce an
administrative summons.
1. Privilege6 8
Perhaps as to the objection based upon privilege it would make
no difference what the nature of the suit is because the policy
behind privilege overrides other considerations regardless of who
has the burden of proof or what that burden is. Both as to executive
privilege and to attorney-client privilege there is a split of author-
ity.69 Some courts have analyzed executive privilege narrowly-
restricting it to cases involving national security.70 Other courts
have construed it so broadly that they grant relief on that basis
summarily.71 Other courts have construed the privilege to extend
to all information not made available to taxpayers by the Freedom
of Information Act.72
As to the availability of the attorney-client privilege there is
also a split of authority.73 Most of the cases asserting attorney-client
privilege involve production of IRS documents under Rule 34, there-
fore, the documents requested become important in determining the
outcome of the cases. However, even considering this there is no
way to reconcile the cases.
68 The government has asserted the housekeeping regulations as a de-
fense to disclosure. It is now generally recognized that those regula-
tions will not constitute a viable defense to disclosure. See United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1954). For a
more extended discussion of the matter see, Kass, supra note 4, at 108.
69 Executive privilege: Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir.
1962); United States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964); but see,
Cenname v. Bingler, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1886 (W.D. Pa. 1961);
E. W. Bliss Co., v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
Attorney-Client privilege: United States v. San Antonio Portland
Cement Co., 33 F.R.D. 513 (W.D. Tex. 1963); but see, United States v.
Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964); Detroit Screwmatic Co. v. United
States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-511 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
70 Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962). See also United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), for the leading authority re-
garding executive privilege (non tax case).
71 Cenname v. Bingler, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1886 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
72 Talbott Constr. Co. v. United States, 49 F.R.D. 68 (E.D. Ky. 1969).
73 Detroit Screwmatic Co. v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-511
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964);
United States v. San Antonio Portland Cement Co., 33 F.R.D. 513
(W.D. Tex. 1963).
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Many of the cases do not rest their decision on one ground, but
rather find several grounds; therefore, it is difficult to weigh the
effect of a particular objection in the outcome of any single case.
At least one court has held that if the government asserts the
defense of privilege it may not use the information that was re-
quested (and denied because of privilege) in formulation of its
case.74 Some courts have suggested that the attorney-client privi-
lege extends only to the materials developed by the Department of
Justice; 75 other courts have extended it to documents prepared by
IRS employees.78 The new rules do not affect discovery of privileged
materials, however, as the wording of the new rules is such that it
discusses materials prepared in anticipation of litigation, more
courts might give a more restrictive definition to attorney-client
privilege in such cases.
2. Relevancy
It is in the area of relevancy that the nature of the case probably
has the most significance. In the tax refund case the taxpayer has
the burden of proof. He must prove his correct tax liability. This
has led at least one court to say:
The most that plaintiff can gain from the matters it seeks is an
idea of defendant's theory as to why Section 531 has application to
it. We do not conceive that this is information to which plaintiff
is entitled. If plaintiff proves its case for the retention of net profits
what difference does it make what theory defendant has to the
contrary?77
However, not all courts feel that the government theory is irrele-
vant.78 It should be noted that the committee notes to the 1970
revision of the rules of civil procedure state that:
Since decision as to relevance to the subject matter of the action
are made for discovery purposes well in advance of trial, a flexible
treatment of relevance is required and the making of discovery,
whether voluntary or under court order, is not a concession or
determination of relevance for purposes of trial 79
74 Continental Distilling Corp. v. Humphrey, 17 F.R.D. 237 (D.D.C. 1955).
75 United States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964); United States
v. San Antonio Portland Cement Co., 33 F.R.D. 513 (W.D. Tex. 1963).
76 Detroit Screwmatic Co. v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-511
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
77 Unistrut Corp. v. United States, 37 F.R.D. 478, 479 (E.D. Mich. 1965).
78 Talbott Constr. Co. v. United States, 49 F.R.D. 68 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
79 Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating
to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 498 (1969).
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It would seem that the court ought to use a looser standard with
regards to relevancy for discovery purposes than it would use for
evidentary purposes. Several cases in the tax refund area have
granted discovery, but usually such cases have a unique twist to
them which makes them readily distinguishable should a subsequent
court desire to distinguish them. In Frazier v. Phinney80 discovery
was allowed, but the deficiency notice sent to the taxpayer merely
said that the determination of additional tax due was made on in-
formation possessed in government files. In Timkin Roller Bearing
v. United States8l the court allowed discovery, but from the facts
of the case the court concluded that the government's contention
must be based upon a "novel" theory.
In suits by the government to collect erroneous refunds tax-
payers have fared better with regard to getting discovery. 82 One
court has held that it is significant that the government is the
moving party. 3 At first glance it would appear irrational to say
that simply by payment of the refund, something that is irrelevant
(the government theory) becomes relevant. However, when one
realizes that the payment (in a suit for erroneous refund) shifts the
burden of proof, it becomes more plausible that this could be the
case. Without knowing what to defend against how can a taxpayer
put on a viable defense to a government claim?
Also, in the area of suits by the government to enforce an
administrative summons, taxpayers are faring better in getting dis-
covery. There is a split of authority as to whether discovery will
be granted, 4 but most courts are at least acknowledging that the
rules of civil procedure apply. 5 Rule 81 (a) (3) provides the basis
for applying the discovery rules (as well as the other rules of civil
procedure).
80 24 F.R.D. 406 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
81 38 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
82 United States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964); United States
v. San Antonio Portland Cement Co., 33 F.R.D. 513 (W.D. Tex. 1963).
83 United States v. San Antonio Portland Cement Co., 33 F.R.D. 513
(W.D. Tex. 1963).
84 Allowing discovery: United States v. Moriarty, 23 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 69-930 (E.D. Wis. 1969); United States v. Nunnally, 21 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 1099 (W.D. Tenn. 1968); United States v. Moriarty, 278
F.2d 187 (E.D. Wis. 1967). Denying discovery: United States v. Salter,
26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-5686 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Jordan,
21 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1014 (W.D. Wash. 1958).
85 Kennedy v. Rubin, 254 F. Supp. 190, (N.D. Ill. 1966). But see, United
States v. Salter, 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-5686 (1st Cir. 1970).
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Simply bringing the case within the rules of civil procedure does
not automatically guarantee the right to discovery.
All provisions as to scope of discovery are subject to the initial
qualification that the court may limit discovery in accordance with
these rules. Rule 26(c) (transferred from 30(b) ) confers broad pow-
ers on the courts to regulate or prevent discovery even though the
materials sought are within the scope of 26(b), and these powers
have always been freely exercised.8 6
There is also authority to the effect that in cases such as these,
the court should not grant discovery.87 The more recent cases,
however, are allowing discovery, at least to show that the summons
was issued for an improper purpose.88 This seems logical, as again,
the government's theory is the very heart of the matter in contro-
versy. Some courts have moderated the application of the rules
by stating that in addition to alleging an improper purpose for the
issuance of the summons, the taxpayer must show some evidence
to support that allegation.8 9 How the taxpayer is to get the evidence
before he gets discovery the court did not explain.
3. Good Cause
Before the 1970 amendments to the rules of civil procedure a
number of tax cases refused to allow discovery of government
documents on the basis that the taxpayer failed to show good
cause.90 By the 1970 amendments the good cause requirement was
dropped from the rule (Rule 34). However, dropping the require-
ment of good cause will not necessarily mean that the taxpayer
will be able to get discovery of the government documents.
The rules are amended by eliminating the general requirement of
"good cause" from Rule 34 but retaining a requirement of a special
showing for trial preparation materials in this subdivision. The re-
quired showing is expressed, not in terms of "good cause" whose
generality has tended to encourage confusion and controversy, but
in terms of the elements of the special showing to be made: sub-
stantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and
inability without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equiva-
lent of the materials by other means....
86 Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating
to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 498 (1969).
87 United States v. Salter, 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-5686 (1st Cir. 1970);
United States v. Jordan, 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1014 (W.D. Wash. 1958).
88 United States v. Nunnally, 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1099 (W.D. Tenn.
1968); United States v. Moriarty, 20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5898 (E.D.
Wis. 1967).
89 United States v. Salter, 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-5686 (1st Cir. 1970).
90 Talbott Constr. Co. v. United States, 49 F.R.D. 68, (E.D. Ky. 1969).
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Elimination of a "good cause" requirement from Rule 34 and the
establishment of a requirement of a special showing in this subdivi-
sion will eliminate the confusion caused by having two verbally
distinct requirements of justification that the courts have been un-
able to distinguish clearly. Moreover, the language of the subdivi-
sion suggests the factors which the courts should consider in de-
termining whether the requisite showing has been made. The im-
portance of the materials sought to the party seeking them in
preparation of his case and the difficulty he will have obtaining
them by other means are factors noted in the Hickman case. The
courts should also consider the likelihood that the party, even if he
obtains the information by independent means, will not have the
substantial equivalent of the documents the production of which
he seeks. 91
Since the good cause distinction, if there ever was one, no longer
has any viability, it would seem that the new area of controversy
which is bound to spring up is whether or not the materials sought
were prepared for trial. The Committee Notes show the importance
of this distinction. "Apart from trial preparation, the fact that the
materials sought are documentary does not in and of itself require
a special showing beyond relevance and absence of privilege."
92
As we shall see later, the Court of Claims has maintained in its
rules the requirement of good cause to get discovery, thus, perhaps
the past cases dealing with good cause in the district courts will
have some precedent value in the Court of Claims.
4. Work Product
Some of the cases that have denied discovery on other grounds
have also stated that the materials sought were the work product
of the government.93 At least some of the cases that have looked
into the issue have decided that IRS records are not protected under
work product,94 and others have stated that work product, unlike
privilege, relevancy or good cause, is not a total defense, but merely
puts more of a burden on the taxpayer in proving his need for such
materials.9 5 The rules, as revised, seem to support this latter state-
ment.
91 Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating
to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 500-01 (1969).
92 Id. at 500.
93 Detroit Screwmatic Co. v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-511
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
94 United States v. San Antonio Portland Cement Co., 33 F.R.D. 513
(W.D. Tex. 1963).
95 Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964).
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The courts are divided as to whether the work-product doctrine
extends to the preparatory work only of lawyers ....
Subdivision (b)(3) reflects the trend of the cases by requiring a
special showing, not merely as to materials prepared by an attorney,
but also as to materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial by or for a party or any representative acting
on his behalf. The subdivision then goes on to protect against dis-
closure the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theo-
ries concerning the litigation of an attorney or other representative
of a party. The Hickman opinion drew special attention to the need
for protecting an attorney against discovery of memoranda prepared
from recollection of oral interviews. The courts have steadfastly
safeguarded against disclosure of lawyers' mental impressions and
legal theories, as well as mental impressions and subject evaluations
of investigators and claim-agents. In enforcing this provision of the
subdivision, the courts will sometimes find it necessary to order
disclosure of a document but with portions deleted.9 6
It would seem that by a special showing of need and inability
to obtain the information elsewhere, it might be possible to discover
the work product of the government. It is important that one
attempt to do so by the correct method. The distinction between
the availability of information by deposition or request for admis-
sions as opposed to the production of documents is shown by the
following language in the Committee Notes:
Rules 33 and 36 have been revised in order to permit discovery
calling for opinions, contentions, and admissions relating not only
to fact but also to the application of law to fact. Under those rules,
a party and his attorney or other representative may be required
to disclose, to some extent, mental impressions, opinions, or conclu-
sions. But documents or parts of documents containing these mat-
ters are protected against discovery by this subdivision. Even
though a party may ultimately have to disclose in response to inter-
rogatories or requests to admit, he is entitled to keep confidential
documents containing such matters prepared for internal use.97
If one is attempting to get information which may be susceptible
to the above objections, he might fare better to attempt to do so
by deposition or request for admissions than by production of docu-
ments. There is some established case law allowing taxpayers to
depose IRS agents 8
5. Failure to Allow Discovery
The tax cases are few in number that discuss the problem arising
upon order by the court, the government is to allow discovery but
96 Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating
to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501-02, (1969).
97 Id. at 502.
98 O'Keefe v. Shaughnessey, 95 F. Supp. 900 (N.D.N.Y. 1951); Brewer v.
Hassett, 2 F.R.D. 222 (D. Mass. 1942).
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refuses to do so. In Campbell v. Eastland99 the court held that the
trial court had abused its discretion by rendering judgment for the
taxpayer simply because the government would not allow discov-
ery.
6. Pre-trial Depositions to Preserve Testimony
Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deal with deposi-
tions to preserve testimony in federal courts (and for pending ap-
peals). Although there is little authority on the subject, it seems
that in appropriate circumstances such a deposition will be per-
mitted prior to issuance of the notice of deficiency by the IRS.
Petition of Ernst'0 0 allowed the taking of testimony from the execu-
trix of an estate regarding gifts in the amount of $162,920 and
$155,360 made by the testator prior to his death. At the time the
petition requesting such a deposition was filed with the court, the
IRS had made no determination of a deficiency with regard to the
estate tax return. The executrix, an elderly lady, was to testify as
to the motives of the gifts made by the deceased. The court dis-
regarded the fact that upon issuance of the deficiency notice the
taxpayer could petition the Board of Tax Appeals (now the U.S.
Tax Court); instead the court stated that the taxpayer had the
alternative remedy of paying the tax and suing for a refund. The
case is quite similar to Estate of Bernard A. Marx v. Commis-
sioner'01 in its facts, thus it would seem that one will receive more
favorable treatment with regard to getting a deposition to preserve
testimony in federal district court than in the U.S. Tax Court.
Another case, In re Boren,10 2 dealt with an attempt to obtain a
deposition to preserve the testimony of several IRS agents (includ-
ing a special agent). The court held that the petition should be
denied because the taxpayer was attempting to use such deposition
as a discovery device rather than a device to preserve known testi-
mony. The facts bear out the result of the court. The petition was
filed with the court after the notice of deficiency was sent to the
taxpayer so the taxpayer could have brought an action against the
government by petitioning the U.S. Tax Court. The deponents were
agents of the adverse party, and the information sought was not
within the knowledge of the party seeking to preserve it.
The extent to which Rule 27 may be used as a discovery device
is not entirely clear.
99 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962).
100 2 F.R.D. 447 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
101 40 T.C. 1 (1963).
102 48 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1864, 55-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9561 (1955).
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The Rule is intended primarily to perpetuate testimony for use as
evidence and not primarily for discovery; and it may not be used
for the sole purpose of framing a complaint. It has been held, on
the other hand, that discovery by depositions under Rule 27 may be
had on a showing that the proposed plaintiff "is presently unable
to bring" the action, the only requisite being that the moving party
convince the court that there is reasonable ground to believe that a
cause of action exists and can be proved if the necessary facilities
are afforded him. 0 3
So the law is unclear as to the extent to which depositions to
preserve testimony may be used as discovery devices. If not used
as a discovery device, there is still authority for allowing such
depositions in tax matters.104 However, this is not the case when
discovery is the primary objective of the taking of the deposition.
C. COURT OF CLAIMS
Rule 71 of the Rules of the Court of Claims describes the scope
of discovery within that court. Rule 36 and Rules 72 through 92
provide the mechanics by which discovery can be attained. A gov-
ernment study released the following conclusion as to discovery in
the Court of Claims:
The position of the Court of Claims on discovery is about inter-
mediate between the Tax Court and the district courts: discovery is
available but not as extensively as in the district courts. The Court
of Claims permits depositions upon oral examination to be taken
for use as evidence or for use as discovery. Depositions in the
Court of Claims, however, are not extrajudicial devices as they are
in district courts; they may be taken only by leave of court on a
showing of good cause. The structure of the Court of Claims gives
rise to another difference in deposition procedures. Under the fed-
eral rules, if a deponent refuses to answer a question, the proponent
may apply to the court in which the deposition is being taken for
an order compelling an answer. While depositions can be taken
anywhere in the United States in a Court of Claims proceeding,
disputes caused by refusal to answer must be resolved by the court
or a commissioner in Washington, D.C.'0 5
The Court of Claims revised its rules on September 1, 1969; the
revision did not seem to substantially change what was discoverable
under the prior rules, but it did change the manner in which it was
discoverable. Prior to the amendments much of the discovery done
in the Court of Claims was done by "calls"'-06 because of the awk-
103 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 544 (1960) (footnotes omitted);
Petition of Johanson Glove Co., 7 F.R.D. 156 (E.D.N.Y. 1945). But see,
Bowles v. Pure Oil Co., 5 F.R.D. 300 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
104 Petition of Ernst, 2 F.R.D. 447 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
105 Dept. of Justice, supra note 50, at 106.
10G M. GBIms & R. FRomE, supra note 47, at 13-18.
316 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 2 (1971)
ward procedures involved in getting other means of discovery. It
appears as if the 1969 revision intended to deemphasize "calls" (see
Rule 75 after the revision as compared to Rule 39 prior to the
revision) and to make the procedures in the court more compatable
with those in the federal district courts.
The revised rules, however, still require a showing of good cause
before discovery will be granted.10 7 The revised rules deal with
requests for admissions (Rule 42 prior to revision), interrogatories
to parties (not provided for prior to the revision), production of
documents (Rule 40 prior to revision), calls (Rule 39 prior to
revision), failure to comply with discovery order (Rule 41 prior to
revision), and several rules as to depositions (Rules 30, 31, 32, 33,
35 and 36 prior to the revision).
Tax cases regarding discovery are rare in the Court of Claims.
However, a novel case, Shakespeare v. United States,0 8 deals with
production of documents and good cause in the Court of Claims.
The taxpayer was attempting to find out if the Commissioner had
issued revenue rulings to other taxpayers that were contrary to
the position taken by the Commissioner in that case. He requested
inspection of all the private rulings issued on the subject from 1954.
He was hoping to gather enough information so that he could make
out a case under one of the equitable doctrines that some authors
feel the court is so susceptible to follow. 0 9 The court denied dis-
covery of the revenue rulings. It talked in terms of good cause,
relevancy and that the documents requested were not calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The request in the
case was overbroad, but the trial commissioner limited his initial
order allowing discovery to those rulings having precedent value.
The court still reversed.
Rule 71 (b) (1) also declares that the "parties may obtain dis-
covery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action. . . ." It goes on
to state that "it is not grounds for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."
107 CT. CL. R. 71(a).
108 389 F.2d 772 (1968).
109 L. KErn & D. ARGUE, supra note 58, at 33.
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Pre-trial Depositions to Preserve Testimony
The Court of Claims does not have a procedure by which one
may preserve testimony prior to petitioning the court. However,
Rule 86 (Rule 33 as amended by the 1969 revisions) provides for
depositions pending certiorari. Also, the Court of Claims' Rule 36
provides for fMling a petition with the court to have discovery against
the government so that a party plaintiff can file properly with the
court a petition based on enough facts to sustain a cause of action.
A Rule 36 petition need not be answered as it is specially for the
purpose of eliciting information possessed by the government. It
must be followed by use of the Court of Claims' other discovery
rules.
IV. CONCLUSION
The taxpayer can conduct discovery of government information
on two levels: the administrative level and the court level. His
primary tool on the administrative level is the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act.110 His tools at the court level are embodied within the
rules of the particular forum he chooses. In the U.S. Tax Court he
is unlikely to gain a substantial amount of information from the
government. Also, the government will not be able to use any tools
of that court to gain information from the taxpayer (however, the
government may still make use of the administrative summons).
In federal district court the taxpayer may be able to gain some
information concerning the government's case. At least this forum
provides the most liberal discovery rules available. On the other
hand, the government will also be able to take advantage of this
liberal discovery practice if it chooses. In the U.S. Court of Claims
the taxpayer may be able to get discovery provided he can prove
good cause in addition to the usual burden of proving relevancy
and a lack of privilege. Compared to the administrative level
(where the government has the burden of proving that the informa-
tion is exempt), this may or may not be disadvantageous depending
on the nature of the information sought.
Usually the taxpayer has knowledge of most of the facts of his
case, however, the modern discovery rules of federal district courts
allow discovery of more than mere facts; they allow discovery of
application of law to fact. Therefore, the unique circumstances of
each case will probably determine the extent to which the taxpayer
will wish to seek information from the government. When this
determination is made, the choice of the forum will be critical for
discovery purposes.
Jeffrey E. Curtiss '72
110 5 U.S.C. 552 (1967).
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APPENDIX
§ 552. Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and pro-
ceedings
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as fol-
lows.:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the
Federal Register for the guidance of the public-
(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the estab-
lished places at which, the employees (and in the case of a uniformed
service, the members) from whom ,and the methods whereby, the public
may obtain information, make submittals or requests, or obtain decisions;
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its func-
tions are channeled and determined, including the nature and require-
ments of all formal and informal procedures available;
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places
at which forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and
contents of all papers, reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized
by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general
applicability formulated and adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms
thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be
adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal
Register and not so published. For the purpose of this paragraph, matter
reasonably available to the class of persons affected thereby is deemed
published in the Federal Register when incorporated by reference therein
with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register.
(2). Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make avail-
able for public inspection and copying-
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as
well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have
been adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal Reg-
ister; and
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect
a member of the public;
unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for sale.
To the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes
available or publishes an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or
staff manual or instruction. However, in each case the justification for the
deletion shall be explained fully in writing. Each agency also shall main-
tain and make available for public inspection and copying a current index
providing identifying information for the public as to any matter issued,
adopted, or promulgated after July 4, 1967, and required by this paragraph
to be made available or published. A final order, opinion, statement of
policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that affects a member
of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency
against a party other than an agency only if-
(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as
provided by this paragraph; or
(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.
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(3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, on request for identifiable
records, made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place,
fees to the extent authorized by statute, and procedure to be followed, shall
make the records promptly available to any person. On complaint, the
district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant
resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency
records are situated, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding
agency records and to order the production of any agency records im-
properly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall
determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain
its action. In the event of noncompliance with the order of the court, the
district court may punish for contempt the responsible employee, and in
the case of a uniformed service, the responsible member. Except as to
causes the court considers of greater importance, proceedings before the
district court, as authorized by this paragraph, take precedence on the
docket over all other causes and shall be assigned for hearing and trial at
the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way.
(4) Each agency having more than one member shall maintain and
make available for public inspection a record of the final votes of each
member in every agency proceeding.
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are -
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar fies the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except
to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition
reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible
for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
(c) This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit
the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this
section. This section is not authority to withhold information from Congress.
